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JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs and appellants Robert and Jackie Face appeal a final order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting defendants and 
appellees Beutler Enterprises, Inc.'s, Mobile Home Transporters', and Byron C. 
Mock's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court properly exercise its broad discretion in 
dismissing the Faces complaint for failure to prosecute where the record showed that 
the Faces failed to appear or appoint counsel in the nine months following their 
counsel's withdrawal, the Faces allowed their case to lie dormant for over nine 
months, and the Faces failed to oppose defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision 
within the broad discretion of the trial court." Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure 
Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ut Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1987). "An appellate court, therefore, 'will not interfere with that decision 
unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there is a 
likelihood an injustice has been wrought.'" Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 
P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Charlie Brown Constr., 740 P.2d at 
1370). This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. 160-164). 
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ISSUE #2: Should this Court refuse to consider issues raised by the Faces for 
the first time on appeal, including their objection to the withdrawal of their counsel, 
their alleged violation of due process, their alleged violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and request for costs and fees? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will not consider arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal. Coombs v. Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 
388 fn 3; 81 P.3d 769. The trial court did not consider or rule upon these issues, the 
issues were not preserved for appeal, and there is no decision for this Court to review. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES & REGULATIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41 Addendum Tab 1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 74 Addendum Tab 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed on March 
14, 2003 by plaintiffs and appellants Robert and Jackie Face (collectively "the Faces"). 
(R. 1-5). The Faces allege that defendants and appellees Beutler Enterprises, Inc., 
Mobile Home Transporters, and Byron C. Mock (collectively "the defendants") 
negligently operated a tractor-trailer causing personal injury to Mr. Face. (R. 1-5). 
Mr. Face alleged he sustained personal injuries in the accident while Mrs. Face alleged 
a loss of consortium claim. (R. 1-5). 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: The defendants timely answered the Faces' 
complaint. (R. 9-12). Subsequently, an attorney planning meeting was held, and on 
May 13, 2003 counsel filed an attorney planning meeting report and proposed 
scheduling order. (R. 22-28). The trial court declined to enter the proposed 
scheduling order because it exceeded the presumptive time limits provided for by 
Court rules. (R. 29). Counsel submitted an amended Case Management Order that 
was entered by the trial court on May 28, 2003. (R. 31-37). In that order, the parties 
stated that the case should be ready for trial by March 5, 2004. (R. 35). 
The parties exchanged initial disclosures and conducted discovery through the 
balance of 2003. (R. 160). On or about December 23, 2003, the parties submitted a 
Stipulation and Joint Motion for a second amendment to the Case Management Order. 
(R. 78-83). The court accepted the stipulation and signed the proposed second 
amended Order. (R. 78-83). That Order extended the readiness for trial date to 
October 1,2004. (R. 82). 
The parties continued to conduct discovery through January 2005. (R. 103). 
On August 2, 2005, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered the parties to 
appear in court on September 6, 2005 and show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 105). In response, on August 15, 2005, the 
Faces' counsel filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. The trial court then scheduled 
a phone conference with the parties' counsel for October 5, 2006. 
On September 16, 2005, the trial court held a telephone conference with Faces' 
attorney, Charles Gruber, and defendants' attorney, Terry Plant. In that conference, 
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Mr. Gruber informed the trial court that his clients were seeking new counsel and that 
he intended to withdraw as counsel for the Faces. (R. 182, p. 2-3). The trial court 
ordered that the Faces had twenty days from September 16, 2005 to appear or appoint 
counsel. (R. 182, p. 4). Mr. Gruber stated that he would telephone the Faces and also 
send them a letter to inform them of his withdrawal and their obligation to appear or 
appoint counsel within twenty days. (R. 182, p. 6). Also, the trial court requested that 
Mr. Plant prepare an Order reflecting Mr. Gruber's withdrawal, the Faces' obligation 
to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days, and that a scheduling conference would 
be held with the court on October 18, 2005 to set a trial date. (R. 182, p. 5-6). 
On September 23, 2005, Mr. Gruber filed with the Court a "Notice of 
Withdrawal of Charles A. Gruber as Attorney for Plaintiff Jackie Face" and a "Notice 
of Withdrawal of Charles A. Gruber as Attorney for Plaintiff Robert Face," and he 
served copies of both notices to the Faces and defendants' counsel. (R. 117-118, 119-
120). On September 27, 2005, defendants' counsel filed a "Notice to Appear or 
Appoint Counsel" informing the Faces of their responsibility to appear or appoint 
counsel within 20 days, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 74. (R. 121-122). On 
September 28, 2005, the trial court entered an Order requiring that the Faces appear or 
appoint counsel by October 5, 2005 and setting a telephone scheduling conference for 
October 18, 2005. (R. 123-125). 
On October 17, 2005, the Faces filed an ex parte Motion for Enlargement of 
Time to Appear or Appoint Counsel. (R. 128-129). On October 18, 2005, the trial 
court held a telephonic scheduling conference with defendants' counsel and the Faces. 
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(R. 183). The trial court granted the Faces request to have until November 18, 2005 to 
appear or appoint counsel. (R. 183, 2-3). 
On November 17, 2005, the Faces again filed an ex parte Motion for 
Enlargement of Time to Appear or Appoint Counsel. (R. 139-140). This time the 
Faces requested an additional sixty days to obtain counsel. (R. 139-140). No 
additional pleadings were filed and no proceedings were held until February 14, 2006 
when defendants' filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (R. 150-151). 
The Faces did not file any pleadings in opposition to defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. Instead, they filed a "Motion for Additional Time to Have New Counsel 
Respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." (R. 152). Thereafter, they did not file 
any responsive pleading to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On June 16, 2006, 
defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision their Motion to Dismiss. (R. 158). 
The Faces did not respond to defendants' Notice to Submit. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: On June 28, 2006, Judge Denise 
Posse Lindberg entered a lengthy "Memorandum Decision Granting Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute." (R. 160-164). Judge Lindberg's decision stated that 
the memorandum decision would serve as the final order and judgment in the case. 
(R. 163). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on August 
9, 2000 in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 1-5). In their Complaint filed on March 14, 
2003, the Faces alleged the accident involved a vehicle owned and operated by Robert 
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Face and a tractor-trailer owned and operated by defendants. (R. 1-5). Mr. Face 
alleged he sustained personal injuries in the accident. His wife, Jackie Face, alleged a 
loss of consortium claim. (R. 1-5). 
2. On April 10, 2003, defendants answered the Faces' Complaint and 
denied all claims of negligence. (R. 9-13). 
3. On May 12, 2003, the parties filed with the trial court an Attorney's 
Planning Meeting Report and Case Management Order. (R. 22-28). 
4. In a Minute Entry dated May 12, 2003, the trial court rejected the 
proposed Case Management Order because the proposed dates exceeded the 
"presumptive limits of Rule 4-103, Code of Judicial Administration." (R. 29). 
5. On May 28, 2003, the parties filed an Amended Attorneys' Planning 
Meeting Report and Case Management Order. (R. 31-37). The parties stated that the 
matter would be ready for trial by March 5, 2004. (R. 31-37). The trial court signed 
the Order on May 28, 2003. (R. 31-37). 
6. Throughout 2003, the parties exchanged and answered written discovery 
and took depositions. (R. 40-77). 
7. On December 23, 2003, the parties filed a Stipulation and Joint Motion 
to Extend Discovery Deadlines and to Modify Attorney Planning Meeting Report and 
Prior Discovery Order and Order. (R. 78-83). The parties stated that the matter would 
be ready for trial after October 1, 2004. (R. 82). The trial court signed the Order on 
December 23, 2003. (R. 82). 
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8. The parties, primarily defendants, continued to take depositions through 
January 2005. (R. 93-104). 
9. On August 2, 2005, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered the parties 
to appear before the court on September 6, 2005 and show cause why the case should 
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 105). 
10. On August 15, 2005, the Faces' counsel filed Plaintiffs5 Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial and requested that the trial court dismiss its Notice of Order to 
Show Cause. (R. 108-110). 
11. On August 23, 2005, the trial court sent the parties a Notice of Phone 
Conference for Scheduling. (R. 111-113). The conference was set for October 5, 
2005 for the purpose of discussing "trial dates, discovery completion dates, jury or 
non-jury trial, trial length, dates for dispositive motions, dates for exchange of witness 
lists, nature and complexity of case, final pretrial date and settlement status." (R. 111-
113). 
12. On September 15, 2005, the trial court sent the parties a Notice of 
Hearing informing that a hearing was scheduled for October 18, 2005. (R. 114-116). 
13. On September 16, 2006, the trial court held a telephone conference with 
the Faces counsel, Charles M. Gruber, and defendants' counsel, Terry M. Plant. (R. 
182). (A transcript of the hearing is attached hereto as Attachment 1.) During the 
conference, Mr. Gruber motioned the trial court to withdraw as counsel for the Faces: 
I will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor. They have 
taken the files back from me about 10 days ago. They informed me that 
they were looking for another attorney, or at least, as I understand I, a 
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second opinion - - a new attorney in this case. I sent a letter confirming 
that. 
I made an agreement with them that I would - - it wouldn't be any sort of 
- - they wouldn't fall through the cracks and I would continue to make 
appearances for them on the telephone status conference and that I would 
be available for Terry to contact me so there wouldn't be a break in 
communications either between defense counsel and the plaintiff or 
between the Court and plaintiffs. 
I have not heard back from them. I have confirmed that in a letter to 
them. So it is my understanding that they are going to be substituting in 
another counsel. I have not heard from other counsel. It's been about 10 
days since they took the files, and I haven't heard from them. They do 
have the file, and that's what's going to be happening, that someone will 
be substituting in, it's my understanding, on my behalf. I told them I 
would stand in for them because I don't want them to be hurt for this 
kind of interim period. That's where we are, your Honor. 
(R. 182, p. 2-3). 
14. The trial court and counsel then had the following exchange: 
The Court: All right. Mr. Plant? 
Mr. Plant: Well, your Honor, my - - and I understand, and Mr. Gruber 
explained that yesterday very well. My concern was - - and I understand 
why the Court got us back on the phone, that there would be some sort of 
a deadline for them to take care of this counsel issue. 
The Court: That's right. I mean I had this set up for a scheduling 
conference to set a trial date. 
Mr. Plant: Uh-huh. 
The Court: Mr. Gruber, I don't want this to cause this matter to kind of, 
you know, drag on indefinitely. 
Mr. Gruber: Sure, and your Honor, I can assure you this isn't a tactic, 
and I know Terry knows this that I wouldn't do this, but it's not - - it's 
my clients honestly want someone else. 
The Court: I'm not concerned about that. 
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Mr. Plant: No one is suggesting that. 
The Court: Yeah, not concerned about that at all. 
Mr. Plant: I just think, your Honor, this thing has languished so long and 
we - - you know, we need to - - we just need to have a date certain for 
them to do whatever they're going to do so we can move this case along. 
The Court: That's entirely appropriate and correct. So why don't we 
say 20 days from today in which to appear or appoint counsel. Then 
let's have a scheduling conference set - - we'll set it for 20 days out. 
(R. 182, p. 3-4). With respect to Mr. Gruber's withdrawal as counsel, the 
Court further stated: 
The Court: One way or another we're moving forward. Now if Mr. 
Gruber were to withdraw right now, there would be an automatic 20 day 
period in which he would be required to give notice - -
Mr. Plant: Right. 
The Court: - - and this is effectively the same thing, but we have the 
benefit of having Mr. Gruber here and being able to communicate with 
his clients. 
Mr. Gruber: I will call them and send a letter to them. 
The Court: All right. That would be perfect. 
(R. 182,5-6). 
15. The trial court asked Mr. Plant to prepare an Order directing the 
Faces to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days of September 16, 2005 and 
setting a scheduling conference for October 18, 2005. (R. 182, p. 5-6). 
16. On September 23, 2005, Mr. Gruber filed pleadings indicating his 
withdrawal as counsel for Robert and Jackie Face. (R. 117-120). Mr. Gruber 
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served copies of the pleadings to the Faces. (R. 117-120). 
17. On September 27, 2005, defendants' counsel filed a Notice to Appear or 
Appoint Successor Counsel and served a copy to the Faces. (R. 121-122). This notice 
informed the Faces that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74, no further proceedings would 
be held in the case until 20 days after the filing of the notice, but after those 20 days 
additional proceedings would be held. (R. 121-122). 
18. On September 28, 2005, the trial court entered a Scheduling Order, 
prepared by Mr. Plant, stating that the Faces must find new counsel or appear in 
person by October 5, 2005. The Scheduling Order also set a telephone scheduling 
conference with the court for October 18, 2005. (R. 123-125). 
19. On October 17, 2005, the Faces filed with the trial court an "Ex-Parte 
Motion for Enlargement of Time to Appoint Counsel." (R. 128-129). In their motion, 
the Faces requested "an Order granting an enlargement of time of at least 30 days to 
obtain counsel." (R. 128). 
20. On October 18, 2005, the trial court held a telephone conference with the 
Faces, appearing pro se, and Mr. Plant, defendants' counsel. (R. 183). (A copy of the 
transcript is attached hereto as Attachment 2.) The Faces requested until November 
18, 2005 to obtain counsel, and the trial court and defendants' counsel agreed to the 
request: 
The Court: All right. I had this set for scheduling purposes, and I've 
received and I've just reviewed, Mr. Face, your ex parte application for 
an enlargement of time. I'm certainly not opposed to extending the time 
for the Faces to obtain counsel. 
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Mr. Plant: Your Honor, I told Mrs. Face - - she called me - - this is 
Terry Plant - - about a week ago or so that I would give her - - agreed to, 
I think - - Mrs. Face, was it the 18th of November that we agreed to? 
The Court: Mr. Face, you should send Mr. Plant a copy of the ex parte 
enlarge - - motion for enlargement of time. That's what was represented 
in the ex parte enlargement as well. I certainly appreciate that and think 
it's entirely appropriate. 
Mr. Plant: Your Honor, I have no objection. In fact, I already agreed to 
it subject only to your approval. 
The Court: Yeah. Well, I certainly appreciate that. I mean that's 
entirely appropriate under the circumstances. Mr. and Mrs. Face, I think 
it - - will November 18th give you sufficient time? 
Ms. Face: Your Honor, that would be of great help to us if you could do 
that. 
The Court: Of course. That's not a problem. In fact, Mr. Plant, I'm 
going to ask that you prepare the order extending the time for Mr. and 
Mrs. Face to appear or appoint counsel to November the 18th. 
(R. 183, p. 2-3). 
21. On October 25, 2005, defendants' counsel served to the Faces and filed 
with the trial court a proposed Order stating that the Faces had until the close of 
business on November 18, 2005 to appear or appoint counsel. (R. 136-138). 
22. On November 17, 2005, the Faces again filed an "Ex Parte Motion for 
Additional Time to Appoint Counsel." (R. 139-140). 
23. No additional pleadings were filed with the trial court and no further 
action was taken in the case until February 14, 2006 when defendants filed a Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41. (R. 150-151). 
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Counsel still had not entered an appearance on behalf of the Faces, and the Faces had 
yet to enter an appearance on their own behalf. (R. 144-149). 
24. In response to defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Faces filed on 
February 27, 2006 a "Motion for Additional Time to have New Counsel Respond to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." (R. 152-153). 
25. Defendants waited until June 16, 2006 to submit their motion to dismiss 
for decision by the trial court. (R. 158-159). Counsel still had not entered an 
appearance on behalf of the Faces, the Faces had yet to enter an appearance on their 
own behalf, and no opposition to defendants' motion had been filed. (R. 158-159). 
26. The Faces did not respond to defendants' Notice to Submit. (R. 161). 
27. On June 28, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision 
Granting Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. (R. 160-163). The trial court's 
decision is four-pages long and contains a factual background, legal analysis and 
conclusions of law. (R. 160-163). The trial court's decision detailed the Faces' failure 
to prosecute their case, and noted that the defendants actively pursued the action. (R. 
160-163). The court concluded that dismissal with prejudice was a harsh sanction, but 
that the facts of the case amply justified such a sanction. (R. 162). 
28. On July 26, 2006, the Faces filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 165). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Faces' complaint for 
their failure to prosecute. Under Utah law, dismissal for failure to prosecute is within 
the broad discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed 
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absent an abuse of that discretion. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
The record shows that after the Faces' counsel entered his withdrawal in September 
2005, the Faces failed to appear or appoint counsel despite receiving notice from both 
the trial court and defendants' counsel of their obligation to do so. Furthermore, for 
over nine months, the Faces allowed their case to lie dormant and they made no effort 
to move it forward. The Faces completely neglected their obligation to prosecute their 
case with due diligence. Accordingly, defendants took action to move the case toward 
resolution by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Faces did not 
oppose the motion. The trial court gave careful consideration to the facts of the case 
and applying well-settled Utah law correctly determined that dismissal was 
appropriate. Indeed, this Court has stated that "plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute 
their claims with due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown 
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975). The record clearly 
establishes the Faces failed to prosecute their case with due diligence, and 
consequently, dismissal of the case was a justified penalty. 
Additionally, the Faces raise arguments on appeal that were not raised or 
preserved in the trial court. Specifically, they contend that the withdrawal of their 
counsel violated Utah R. Civ. P. 74, and also violated their right to due process and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. However, the Faces ignore the fact that they did not 
lodge any objection to their counsel's withdrawal with the trial court. Furthermore, 
the record evidences that the Faces' counsel's withdrawal complied with Utah R. Civ. 
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P. 74, and there is no legal basis for their alleged violations of due process and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD 
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE FACES COMPLAINT FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BECAUSE THE FACES FAILED TO 
APPEAR OR APPOINT COUNSEL AS ORDERED BY THE 
COURT AND INSTEAD ALLOWED THEIR CASE TO LIE 
DORMANT FOR OVER NINE MONTHS. 
The case record clearly establishes that after the Faces' counsel withdrew in 
September 2005, they completely failed to prosecute their claims against defendants. 
Upon their counsel's withdrawal, the Faces were informed by defendants' counsel as 
well as the Court of their obligation to retain new counsel or enter their own 
appearance. Despite having over nine months to do so, the Faces failed to meet their 
obligation. The Faces did not take any action to move their case toward resolution. 
Instead, anytime action was taken on the case by either defendants' counsel or the trial 
court, the Faces responded by simply requesting more time to appoint counsel. 
Because of the Faces failure to take substantive action on their case, the trial court 
properly exercised its broad discretion and dismissed the case. 
Under well settled Utah law, "plaintiffs are required 'to prosecute their claims 
with due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 
Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Maxfield 
v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975). Furthermore, with respect to a plaintiffs 
failure to prosecute, this Court has stated: "Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only 
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from the standpoint of the parties, but also because it constitutes an abuse of the 
judicial process." Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1993). In cases where a plaintiff fails to prosecute their case, Utah R. Civ. P. 
41(b) expressly allows the trial court to dismiss the case with prejudice. Indeed, this 
Court has stated that "Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad 
discretion of the trial court." Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1214. Utah's appellate 
courts will not interfere with a trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute absent an 
abuse of discretion. Id Here, the record establishes that there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
Prior to the withdrawal of the Faces' counsel, the trial court was concerned by 
the Faces' failure to diligently prosecute their case. Indeed, on September 6, 2005 the 
trial court, on its own motion, ordered the parties to show cause as to why the case 
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 105). In response, the Faces filed 
a Certificate of Readiness for Trial requesting that the trial court set a pre-trial 
conference in order to set a trial date. (R. 108-109). In the scheduling conference to 
set a trial date, the Faces' counsel stated he would be withdrawing at the Faces' 
request. (R. 182, p.2). The trial court informed counsel that regardless of counsel's 
withdrawal, he would not allow the matter to drag on indefinitely. (R. 183, p. 3). 
Moreover, the Court stated that regardless of whether the Faces timely appeared or 
appointed counsel, the case would move forward. (R. 183, p. 6). 
There can be no question that the Faces were aware of their obligation to appear 
or appoint counsel and to move their case forward. To be sure, after the Faces' 
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counsel entered his withdrawal the trial court held a telephone conference with the 
Faces and defendants' counsel to establish a deadline for the Faces to retain counsel or 
enter their own appearance. The trial court stated, "Okay. Mr. Face, the reason I 
didn't scrub the telephone conference is it was purely for this purpose, to make sure 
we're all on the same page and to set a time certain for you to get counsel." (R. 183, p. 
4). In that October 18, 2005 telephone conference, the Faces requested thirty days to 
retain counsel, and the trial court granted their request. The following exchange took 
place: 
The Court: Mr. and Mrs. Face, I think it - - will November 18 give you 
sufficient time? 
Ms. Face: Your Honor, that would be of great help to us if you could do 
that. 
The Court: Of course. That's not a problem. In fact, Mr. Plant, I'm 
going to ask that you prepare an order extending the time for Mr. and 
Mrs. Face to appear or appoint counsel to November 18th. 
(R. 183, p. 3). Pursuant to the trial court's request, defendants' counsel prepared and 
served upon the Faces an order stating that the Faces had until November 18, 2005 to 
appoint counsel, and that if they failed to do so, the court would entertain appropriate 
motions. (R. 137-138). Despite being well informed of their obligation to move their 
case forward and the potential consequences of failing to do so, the Faces nevertheless 
failed to obtain counsel by November 18, 2005 and took no action to move their case 
forward. 
Instead, on November 17, 2005, the Faces requested an additional sixty days to 
appoint counsel. (R. 139-140). Despite the fact that the Faces had already had at least 
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90 days to retain new counsel, the defendants and the Court did not object to the 
Faces' request for an additional 60 days. By January 18, 2006, the expiration date of 
the 60 day period, the Faces had again failed to appoint counsel or take any action 
whatsoever to move their case forward. 
Defendants' counsel then gave the Faces nearly another 30 days before filing a 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on February 14, 
2006. The Faces did not oppose defendants' motion. Instead, as per usual, they 
simply requested additional time from the Court to retain counsel to oppose the 
motion. (R. 152). Again, the defendants' and the Court did not object to the Faces' 
request for additional time. However, by June 16, 2006, four months after defendants 
filed their motion, the Faces still had not appointed counsel, had not entered their own 
appearance, and had not taken any action to prosecute their case. Accordingly, 
defendants filed a notice to submit their motion to dismiss for decision of the trial 
court. (R. 158-159). 
By this time, the trial court had allowed the Faces nearly nine months to appoint 
counsel or appear on their own behalf. During that period, the Faces could have 
entered their own appearance and taken any number of steps to move their case 
forward. In allowing the Faces considerable time to appear or appoint counsel, the 
trial court afforded the Faces an opportunity to be heard and to do justice, however the 
Faces abused that opportunity through their dilatory conduct. The Faces wholly failed 
to shoulder their burden of prosecuting their claims with due diligence, and dismissal 
was the proper consequence of their inaction. The trial court did not abuse its broad 
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discretion by dismissing the Faces' complaint. See Country Meadows v. Dept. of 
Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH LAW IN 
DISMISSING THE FACES' COMPLAINT. 
The trial court gave detailed consideration to defendants' motion to dismiss as 
well as the totality of the circumstances of the case, and properly concluded that 
dismissal was justified under well settled Utah law. Both this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have promulgated a standard to help trial courts determine whether a 
party has shown a justifiable excuse for failing to prosecute their case. (R. 161). The 
five factors, in addition to the length of time elapsed, used to determine the propriety 
of a dismissal for failure to prosecute include: "(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each has had to move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to 
move the case forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been 
caused to the other side; and (5) 'most important, whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal.'" Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)). These five factors are known as the 
"Westinghouse factors" and they are not to be considered in isolation, but rather the 
totality of the circumstances should be considered. IdL The trial court analyzed each 
factor in the context of this case and correctly concluded that the Faces failure to 
prosecute their case warranted dismissal with prejudice. 
The first factor considered by the trial court was the conduct of both parties. 
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The trial court stated: 
It has been more than three (3) years since the case was filed, more than 
eighteen (18) months since there was any substantive work on this case 
(and what discovery has occurred it appears to have been driven 
primarily by the defendants), and over (9) months since the Court 
initiated the OSC and Plaintiffs began seeking extensions of time. The 
Court believes enough is enough. It is evident Plaintiffs have failed to 
fulfill their repeated promises to the Court, and have been totally non-
responsive since February 2006. 
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendants primarily moved 
the case forward by diligently conducting discovery. Specifically, in addition to 
deposing the Faces, defendants' counsel also deposed three of Mr. Face's doctors (Dr. 
Matsuo, Dr. Murdock, and Dr. Snyder) as well as two forensic experts designated by 
the Faces (Ron Probert and Dave Ingebretsen). (R. 93-100). Conversely, the Faces 
deposed only defendant Mock. (R. 65-66). And after the defendants deposed Dr. 
Matsuo in January 2005, the Faces did not conduct any further discovery. The record 
clearly demonstrates that prior to the Faces' counsel's withdrawal in September 2005, 
the defendants were the driving force in moving the case forward. 
The defendants ability to move the case forward was subsequently prejudiced 
by the withdrawal of the Faces counsel in September 2005. Utah R. Civ. P. 74(b) 
required the defendants to notify the Faces of their obligation to appear or appoint 
counsel and also required that the proceedings be stayed until twenty days after 
defendants served the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel to the Faces. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 74(b). The defendants complied with the rule and notified the Faces of their 
obligation to appear or appoint counsel and no proceedings were held until 20 days 
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after the Faces were notified of their obligation. However, once notified of their 
obligation to appear or appoint counsel, the Faces requested additional time to find 
counsel and did not take any substantive action to move their case forward. 
Defendants gave the Faces every opportunity to appear or appoint counsel and 
did not prejudice their ability to do so. However, because the Faces were not 
represented and refused to enter their own appearance, the defendants could not move 
the case forward. Accordingly, on February 14, 2006, after the Faces had had nearly 
five months to appear or appoint counsel and failed to do so, defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. When the Faces failed to respond to the 
motion after four months, defendants submitted the motion for decision. 
The first of the five Westinghouse factors, conduct of the parties, therefore 
supports the trial court's decision to dismiss. The record shows that the defendants 
actively moved the case forward while the Faces were repeatedly dilatory and 
essentially ignored their responsibility to prosecute their claim. 
The second factor required the trial court to analyze "the opportunity each has 
had to move the case forward." Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 
1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Here again, the record shows that the defendants 
took advantage of their opportunity to move the case forward by deposing the Faces as 
well as their medical providers and forensic experts. Additionally, the defendants tried 
to push the case toward resolution by filing an Offer of Judgment pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 68. (R. 101-102). The Faces similarly had ample opportunity to move the case 
forward by conducting their own discovery and readying their case for trial. However, 
once the Faces counsel withdrew after certifying the case ready for trial, the Faces 
took no further action to move their case forward. They could have moved the case 
forward by entering their own appearance or obtaining new counsel, but they failed to 
do so. Here again, the second Westinghouse factor supports the trial court's dismissal 
of the case. 
The third factor required the trial court to look at "what each party has done to 
move the case forward." Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 
1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court noted that the defendants' discovery efforts 
were the primary force in moving the case forward. (R. 162). Conversely, after 
certifying their case as ready for trial, the Faces failed to take any action to then move 
the case forward. After their counsel withdrew and both defendants' counsel and the 
trial court gave the Faces notice of their obligation to appear or appoint, the Faces 
failed to appear or appoint counsel. Furthermore, the Faces also failed to oppose 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Other than certifying their 
case as ready for trial in August 2005, the record shows that the Faces took no action 
to move their case forward from January 2005 until the trial court granted defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss in July 2006. The Faces can cite to no action or inaction by 
defendants to support their failure to move the case forward, however even if they 
could, dismissal would still be appropriate. "Although inaction on the part of a 
defendant may contribute to the justifiability of a plaintiff s excuse for delay, the duty 
to prosecute is a duty of due diligence imposed on a plaintiff, not on a defendant." 
Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). The 
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Faces breached their duty of due diligence, and the trial court correctly determined that 
the Faces' inaction favored dismissal under the third Westinghouse factor. 
The fourth Westinghouse factor required the trial court to consider "the amount 
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side." Meadow 
Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ.. 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (UtahCt. App. 1991). Here, 
the Faces inaction in general and their failure to appear or appoint counsel in particular 
prejudiced the defendants because the defendants could not move the case forward. 
After the Faces counsel entered his withdrawal, defendants counsel notified the Faces 
that they had twenty days to appear or appoint counsel. In response, the Faces 
requested an additional thirty days from the trial court, and the trial court granted their 
request. At the expiration of that thirty day period, the Faces requested an additional 
sixty days to appear or appoint. During this nearly four month period, the defendants 
could not move the case forward because they were waiting on the Faces to fulfill their 
procedural obligation. The defendants could not set the matter for trial and could not 
pursue any additional discovery because the Faces were not represented and had not 
entered an appearance in the case. The Faces' failure to appear or appoint counsel 
effectively stalled the litigation and prejudiced the defendants' ability to move the case 
forward. Accordingly, the fourth Westinghouse factor favors the trial court's dismissal 
of the Faces' case. 
Finally, the fifth factor required the trial court to determine whether injustice 
would result from the dismissal. Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 
1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). With respect to this prong, the trial court stated: 
To be sure, a dismissal will prejudice the Plaintiffs, who will then be 
foreclosed from pursuing the relief sought. However, the Court's sense 
of justice is not offended because of this outcome. It was completely 
within the Plaintiffs' control to act, and they chose not to do so. The 
Court and defendants have been more than patient and accommodating 
to Plaintiffs' requests. In short, any "injustice" resulting from this 
dismissal lies solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs. 
(R. 162). The Faces had nearly nine months to appear or appoint counsel and take 
some action to move their case forward. The trial court and defendants' counsel were 
overly fair to the Faces by indulging their repeated requests for additional time to 
retain counsel. However, the Faces were well aware that the trial court's and 
defendants' patience was not unlimited. Both the trial court and defendants' counsel 
informed the Faces of their obligation to move their case forward and yet they still 
failed to do so. There can be no question that the trial court afforded the Faces an 
opportunity both to be heard and to do justice, and they nevertheless abused that 
opportunity through their dilatory conduct. The Faces' dilatory conduct cancels out 
any injustice they sustained due to the dismissal of their claim. 
The Faces argue that the Westinghouse factors do not support dismissal because 
their case did not lie dormant for years on end. The Faces cite two cases where 
dismissals for failure to prosecute were reversed on appeal even though the matters 
had been pending for several years. They contend that their case is much less 
egregious than those cases and thus the trial court erred. Appellants' Brief at p. 23. 
Both cases are distinguishable. 
In Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah 1959), the Utah 
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Supreme Court reversed a trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s complaint and 
defendants' counterclaim for failure to prosecute. The case was an action to quiet title 
that went on for many years. The plaintiff and defendants allowed the case to lie 
dormant for nearly five years before the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute. Id. at p. 625. The trial court denied the motion. A couple months later, the 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice and the trial court granted the 
motion. Id. The plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case because the plaintiffs' failed to 
prosecute their claim. Id at 626. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed. Noting that 
both the plaintiff and defendants' had asserted claims against the other, the court 
stated: "Since any party to this action could have obtained the relief to which it was 
entitled at any time had it wanted but both parties chose to dally for a number of years, 
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant [defendants'] motion to dismiss with 
prejudice." Id. at p. 626. 
In this case, the defendants' did not choose to dally, but instead attempted to 
move the case along. Conversely, the Faces allowed their claim to stand still and did 
not take any action on it for nearly nine months. The defendants' could not move the 
case forward due to the Faces' failure to appear or appoint counsel. Consequently, the 
Crystal Lime case does not support the Faces' position. 
The second case cited by the Faces, Wright v. Howe, 150 P. 956 (Utah 1915), is 
likewise distinguishable. In Wright, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the 
value of four horses that died after consuming defective linseed oil sold to plaintiff by 
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the defendant. Id. at p. 589. After the matter had been pending in the trial court for 
about three years, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute 
alleging that "the plaintiff herein has failed and neglected to prosecute said action with 
reasonable diligence." Id The trial court denied the motion and the case proceeded to 
trial where the plaintiff prevailed. The defendant appealed and argued that the trial 
court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion, stating: "The defendants had the same right 
to press the action to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they were willing to permit it to 
remain untried, and especially in the absence of any showing of prejudice, they cannot 
complain." Id. 
In this case, because the Faces failed to appear or appoint counsel, the 
defendants could not move the case forward. When defendants attempted to do so, the 
Faces responded with a request for more time to appear or appoint. After defendants 
allowed the Faces nearly five months to appoint counsel or enter their own appearance, 
they attempted to move the case forward by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute. And the Faces failed to oppose the motion. The defendants were not 
willing to permit the case to remain untried, but the Faces were. Accordingly, the 
Wright case does not support the Faces' argument. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Faces' complaint. 
After allowing the Faces nearly nine months to appear or appoint counsel and move 
their case forward, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss which the 
Faces did not oppose. As evidenced by the trial court's detailed memorandum 
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decision, the trial court gave careful and detailed consideration to well-settled Utah 
law and correctly determined that the Faces' dilatory conduct justified the dismissal of 
their case. 
III. BECAUSE THE FACES RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL THAT 
THEY DID NOT RAISE OR PRESERVE IN THE TRIAL COURT, 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER THEM. 
The Faces raise three new issues on appeal: (1) they argue that the trial 
court erred in allowing their former counsel to withdraw; (2) they argue their 
constitutional right to due process was violated due to their counsel's withdrawal; 
and (3) they argue that their counsel's withdrawal somehow violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The Faces did not raise or preserve 
these issues in the trial court, and the trial court did not consider them. This Court has 
stated that it will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Coombs v. 
Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 388 fn 3; 81 P.3d 769. Accordingly, 
this Court should disregard these arguments. However, should the Court elect to 
entertain these issues, the Faces arguments are not well taken. 
The Faces did not file or raise any objection to their counsel's withdrawal, and 
the trial court did not err by allowing the withdrawal. The record evidences that the 
Faces' counsel actually withdrew at the Faces' request. (R. 182, p. 2). In a telephone 
conference with the trial court on September 16, 2005, counsel stated: 
The Court: All right. I understand, Mr. Gruber, that you intend to 
withdraw? 
Mr. Gruber: I will withdraw at the direction of my clients, your Honor. 
They have taken the files back from me about 10 days ago. They 
informed me that they were looking for another attorney, or at least, as I 
understand it, a second opinion - a new attorney in this case. I sent a 
letter confirming that. 
(R. 182, p. 2). The trial court then directed defendants' counsel to prepare an order 
informing the Faces of their obligation to appear or appoint counsel within 20 days, 
and the trial court set another scheduling conference for October 18, 2005. (R. 182, p. 
5-6). Defendants' counsel prepared an order reflecting the trial court's ruling allowing 
Mr. Gruber to withdraw and granting the Faces twenty days to appear or appoint 
counsel. (R. 123-125). The order was filed with the court, served to the Faces' 
counsel, and signed by the judge. (R. 123-125). Mr. Gruber then filed with the trial 
court a formal notice of withdrawal and served the same to the Faces. (R. 117-120). 
Furthermore, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74(b), defendants' counsel served to the 
Faces a notice to appear or appoint counsel informing them of their obligation to enter 
an appearance or retain substitute counsel within twenty days. (R. 121-122). The 
Faces do not deny that they received all of these pleadings and that they were fully 
aware of their obligation to appear or appoint counsel. Moreover, the Faces do not 
deny that they raised no objection with the trial court as to their counsel's withdrawal. 
The trial court, the Faces' former counsel, and defendants' counsel all complied with 
the procedural requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 74. Specifically, the Faces' former 
counsel moved the trial court to allow his withdrawal, the trial court allowed 
withdrawal pursuant to a written order, and defendants' counsel timely informed the 
Faces of their obligation to appear or appoint counsel. Accordingly, the Faces' 
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contention that the trial court erred by allowing their counsel to withdraw is without 
merit. 
The Faces also contend that their counsel's withdrawal violated their right to 
due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because they 
were denied an opportunity to be heard as well as their day in court. The Faces cite no 
authority to support their contention other than citing to Utah R. Civ. P. 74. They 
claim that their former counsel, the trial court, and defendants' counsel failed to 
comply with that rule's requirements for withdrawal of counsel. As set forth in the 
preceding paragraph, their counsel, the trial court, and defendants' counsel all 
complied with the procedural requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 74. Furthermore, the 
Faces did have both an opportunity to be heard as well as an opportunity to have their 
day in court. However, the Faces failed to seize those opportunities by neglecting to 
enter their own appearance, neglecting to appoint counsel, and neglecting to oppose 
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. 
The Faces further contend that because Mr. Face alleges that he has a brain 
injury he is entitled to protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
and the trial court should have "more reasonable steps in protecting his rights in this 
action." Appellants' Brief at p. 29.! The Faces again cite no authority to support their 
contention. Moreover, they cite to no instance where they requested from the trial 
court any relief or accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Indeed, 
the only relief the Faces requested from the trial court was additional time to appear or 
1
 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq. 
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appoint counsel. The trial court effectively granted the Faces nearly nine months to 
appear or appoint counsel, but the Faces failed to do so. Consequently, the Faces' 
argument fails. 
The Faces were not unfairly taken advantage of in the proceedings below, the 
Faces' procedural rights were not abused, and the Faces were not denied 
accommodation by the trial court. The Faces cannot deny that they received notice of 
their counsel's withdrawal. The Faces cannot deny that they were informed of their 
obligation to appear or appoint counsel. The Faces cannot deny that they received 
ample time from defendants' counsel and the trial court to enter their own appearance 
or appoint counsel and to prosecute their case. The Faces never raised any objection to 
their counsel's withdrawal in the proceedings below, and they should not be allowed to 
do so now. 
IV. THE FACES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS. 
The Faces assert that they are entitled to an award of costs, but cite no authority 
or legal basis to support their assertion. Because the trial court properly exercised its 
broad discretion in dismissing the Faces' claim for failure to prosecute, and because 
the Faces have established no basis for their claim for appellate costs, this Court 
should deny their request. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. The Faces had over nine months to enter their own 
appearance or retain new counsel and to take some action to move their case forward. 
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Instead, they allowed the case to lie dormant for months on end. Moreover they failed 
to oppose defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. There can be no 
question that the Faces had ample opportunity to be heard and to do justice, but they 
abused that opportunity by ignoring their obligation to appear or appoint counsel and 
neglecting their burden to move their case forward. Consequently, the trial court's 
dismissal of the Faces' complaint is an appropriate sanction for their dilatory conduct. 
DATED this &I day of March, 2007. 
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e 41. Dismissal of actions. 
Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(1), and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the 
ntiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or other 
)onse to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without 
udice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed 
ny court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under paragraph (1} of this subdivision of this rule, an action 
i only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or 
2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the 
ice upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
iterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
nvoluntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a 
indant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, 
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not 
rted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close 
I the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
dication upon the merits. 
)ismissa! of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, 
s-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall 
lade before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
)osts of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon 
eluding the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously 
lissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
tond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
i , pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in 
)0rt of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy 
obtained. 
Tab 2 
e 74. Withdrawal of counsel. 
An attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of 
idrawal shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no hearing or trial has been 
If a motion is pending or a hearing or trial has been set, an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
i motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing or trial. 
If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, the 
osing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to 
ear personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further 
:eedings shall be held in the case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party 
yes the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing and serving a notice of substitution of counsel signed 
ormer counsel, new counsel and the client. Court approval is not required if new counsel certifies in the notice of substitution that 
nsel will comply with the existing hearing schedule and deadlines. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
toMtyCbrk* 
ROBERT AND JACKIE FACE., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEUTLER ENTERPRISES, INC., MOBILE 
HOME TRANSPORTERS, and BYRON 
CHESTER MOCK, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE 
Civ. No. 030905851 
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
%l At issue before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. After 
reviewing the parties5 pleadings the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the case with 
prejudice, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Tf2 This case involves a suit filed on or about March 14, 2003 by Plaintiffs Robert and Jackie 
Face alleging that defendants were negligent in the operation of a tractor-trailer causing personal 
injury to Mr. Face, and a loss of consortium claim on behalf of Mrs. Face. 
f 3 An attorney planning report and proposed scheduling order were submitted to the Court 
on or about May 13, 2003, but the Court declined to enter the Order because the proposed order 
exceeded the presumptive time limits provided for by Court rules. In its minute entry declining 
to sign the proposed order the Court noted that absent good cause for delay, the case would have 
to be certified for trial within 330 days after the Answer was filed, or the it would be dismissed. 
Tf4 An amended Case Management Order was approved by the Court on May 28, 2003. 
Pursuant to that Order the parties indicated to the Court that the matter would be ready for trial 
by March 5,2004. 
f5 The parties exchanged initial disclosures and conducted discovery through the balance of 
2003. On or about December 23, 2003 the parties submitted a Stipulation and Joint Motion for a 
second amendment to the Case Management Order. The Court accepted the stipulation and 
signed the proposed second amended Order . That Order extended the readiness for trial date to 
October 1,2004. 
%6 Based on the case record it appears that discovery continued through January 25, 2005. 
After that date, no action appears to have taken place on the case, so the Court noticed the case 
for an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. The OSC was scheduled for September 6, 2005. In response, Plaintiffs' counsel filed 
a certificate of readiness for trial and asked that the OSC hearing be stricken. 
f 7 The Court then scheduled a telephonic conference with the parties, at which time counsel 
for Plaintiffs informed the Court that he would be withdrawing as counsel and Plaintiffs would 
secure new counsel. As a result of that telephonic conference the Court ordered that Plaintiffs 
find new counsel or appear pro se within 20 days. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 74, defendants 
filed their notice to appear or appoint successor counsel. A follow up telephonic scheduling 
conference was scheduled for October 18, 2005 to finalize what needed to occur to bring the 
matter to trial. 
f 8 On the day prior to the scheduled telephonic conference, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Enlargement of Time to Appoint Counsel, seeking a thirty (30) day extension. Defendants did not 
oppose that extension, and Plaintiffs were then given until November 18, 2005 to secure new 
counsel. 
Tf9 Again the day before that extension was to run out, Plaintiffs again filed another request 
for extension of time, this time asking for an additional 60 days. Although there is no express 
entry in the record, it appears that Defendants again acquiesced to the requested extension. 
However, by February 14, 2006, Defendants apparently ran out of patience and filed the present 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
TflO On February 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a third affidavit and Motion for Extension of time, 
this time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. Since that time, Plaintiffs have taken no further 
action to move this case forward. On June 16, 2006, Defendants filed a notice to submit on their 
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs have not responded. 
ANALYSIS 
Tfl 1 The plaintiff bears the duty to prosecute its case with due diligence. Charlie Brown 
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute its case with due diligence, a trial court has discretion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs case. WestinghouseElec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 
876, 879 (Utah 1975); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc., 740 P.2d at 1370. The Utah Supreme 
Court has set forth factors to help trial courts determine whether a party has shown a justifiable 
excuse for its failure to prosecute. In addition to the length of time that has lapsed, the relevant 
considerations are: "(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has to move 
the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of 
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal." Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State 
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); accord Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544 
P.2d at 879. These factors are not to be considered in isolation. Country Meadows Convalescent 
Ctr. v. Utah Dept. of Health Div. Of Health Care Fin., 851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). Rather, the totality of the circumstances should be considered when determining if an 
action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute with due diligence. Id. 
f 12 As noted above, there has been no substantive action to move the case forward since 
January 2005 when defendants conducted the last of their depositions of Mr. Face's treating 
physicians. After the Court on its own motion scheduled the OSC hearing, the Plaintiffs' 
counsel certified the matter for trial and then withdrew. Plaintiffs have been given extension 
after extension to secure new counsel, yet they have utterly failed to do so. In fact, it is telling 
that they have not even attempted to respond to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants in 
February 2006, other than to again ask for an extension of time. 
T|13 It has been more than three (3) years since the case was filed, more than eighteen (18) 
months since there was any substantive work on this case (and what discovery has occurred it 
appears to have been driven primarily by the defendants), and over nine (9) months since the 
Court initiated the OSC and Plaintiffs began seeking extensions of time. The Court believes 
enough is enough. It is evident Plaintiffs have failed to fulfill their repeated promises to the 
Court, and have been totally non-responsive since February 2006. 
f 14 As referenced above, in evaluating a motion to dismiss the Court must consider what 
actions, if any, were taken by each side in order to move the case forward. In this case, Plaintiffs 
were clearly on notice of this Court's intention to manage its caseload and not allow matters to 
languish for years without action. Once their counsel withdrew, Plaintiffs received repeated 
extensions to appoint new counsel, all the while protesting that they could not represent 
themselves. 
TJ15 In contrast to Plaintiffs' inaction, it appears that the defendants have actively pursued this 
action. They have engaged in substantial discovery, including deposing Mr. Face's treatment 
providers. 
Tfl6 Defendants have not addressed how they will be prejudiced if this matter is continued, but 
that prong, by itself, is not determinative. The burden was on Plaintiffs to show why dismissal 
would not be warranted on these facts, or to offer reasonable excuse for their lack of diligence. 
Based on Plaintiffs' failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, and the fact they have remained 
silent for the subsequent 5 months since the motion was filed, the Court can reasonably conclude 
that Plaintiffs have nothing to offer that would justify their continued inaction. 
f 17 To be sure, a dismissal will prejudice the Plaintiffs, who will then be foreclosed from 
pursuing the relief sought. However, the Court's sense of justice is not offended because of this 
outcome. It was completely within Plaintiffs' control to act, and they chose not to do so. The 
Court and defendants have been more than patient and accommodating to Plaintiffs' requests, in 
short, any "injustice resulting from this dismissal lies solely and exclusively with Plaintiffs. 
1f 18 The Court realizes that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction. The facts of this 
case, however, amply justify this sanction. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
119 Defendants' Motion To Dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED. This memorandum 
decision shall serve as the final order and judgment in this case; the parties need not submit a 
separate order. 
Entered this 28th day of June, 2006. 
BY THE COUWf(^^ 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on September 16, 2005) 
3 THE COURT: Let me find the right file here. Here we 
4 go. This is the matter of Mr. Robert Face vs. — is it Beutler? 
5 MR. PLANT: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Enterprises, Inc. and it's case 
7 No. 030905851. Would you go ahead and enter your appearances 
8 again for the record? 
9 MR. GRUBER: My name is Charles Gruber, G-r-u-b-e-r. 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 MR. GRUBER: Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
12 Jackie — Bob and Jackie Face. 
13 MR. PLANT: Your Honor, this is Terry Plant on behalf of 
14 the defendants, Beutler Enterprises. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I understand, Mr. Gruber, that 
16 you intend to withdraw? 
17 MR. GRUBER: I will withdraw at the direction of my 
18 clients, your Honor. They have taken the files back from me 
19 about 10 days ago. They informed me that they were looking for 
20 another attorney, or at least, as I understand it, a second 
21 opinion — a new attorney in this case. I sent a letter 
22 confirming that. 
23 I made an agreement with them that I would — it 
24 wouldn't be sort of — they wouldn't fall through the cracks and 
25 I would continue to make the appearances for them on the 
2 6 telephone status conference and that I would be available 
~3
~ 
1 for Terry to contact me so there wouldn't be a break in 
2 communications either between defense counsel and the plaintiff 
3 or between the Court and the plaintiffs. 
4 I have not heard back from them. I have confirmed that 
5 in a letter to them. So it is my understanding that they are 
6 going to be substituting in another counsel. I have not heard 
7 from other counsel. It's been about 10 days since they took the 
8 files, and I haven't heard from them. They do have the file, and 
9 that's what's going to be happening, that someone will be 
10 substituting in, it's my understanding, on my behalf. I told 
11 them that I would stand in for them because I don't want them to 
12 be hurt for this kind of interim period. That's where we are, 
13 your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Plant? 
15 MR. PLANT: Well, your Honor, my — and I understand, 
16 and Mr. Gruber explained that yesterday very well. My concern 
17 was — and I understand why the Court got us back on the phone, 
18 that there would be some sort of a deadline for them to take care 
19 of this counsel issue. 
20 THE COURT: That's right. I mean I had set this up for 
21 a scheduling conference to set a trial date. 
22 MR. PLANT: Uh-huh. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Gruber, I don't want this to cause this 
24 matter to kind of, you know, drag on indefinitely. 
25 MR. GRUBER: Sure, ans your Honor, I can assure you this 
26 isn't a tactic, and I know Terry knows this that I wouldn't do 
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1 MR. PLANT: Probably, just to be safe, I better not set 
2 anything until the week after — the 24th of October, somewhere 
3 thereabouts. 
4 THE COURT: Christine, can we set a telephone conference 
5 sometime during that week? 
6 CHRISTINE: I show one on the 18th; do you want to cancel 
7 that one? 
8 THE COURT: Are you in trial on the 18th? 
9 MR. PLANT: I might not be, but I — 
10 THE COURT: Yeah, let's — 
11 MR. PLANT: — I could be. 
12 THE COURT: Let's — 
13 MR. PLANT: Probably won't be, but you know how it goes. 
14 THE COURT: Well, let's leave it on the 18th where it 
15 currently is. You set that yesterday? 
16 MR. PLANT: Right. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let's just leave that in place. 
18 If it turns out that you can't make it just call and we'll 
19 reschedule it. 
2 0 MR. PLANT: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: Okay? 
22 MR. GRUBER: Your Honor, just — could I just refresh my 
23 memory? That's at 3:30 on the 18th? 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 
25 MR. PLANT: And so let me make sure, your Honor, so I 
2 6 don't mess up the order, doing 3:30 on the 18th as a scheduling 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
conference, and they 
counsel or appear in 
THE COURT: 
MR. PLANT: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PLANT: 
THE COURT: 
-6-
have 20 days from today to appoint new 
person, right? 
Yes. 
And what's the downside if they don't? 
Well, we're moving forward. 
Okay, I get you. I 
One way or another we're moving forward. 
Now if Mr. Gruber were to withdraw right now there would be an 
automatic 20 day per 
notice — 
MR. PLANT: 
THE COURT: 
iod in which he would be required to give 
Right. 
— and this is effectively the same thing, 
but we have the benefit of having Mr. Gruber here and being able 
to communicate with 
MR. GRUBER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PLANT: 
his clients. 
I will call them and send a letter to them. 
All right. That would be perfect. 
All right. So I'll prepare an order and get 
it over to you for approval, Charles, before you withdraw. 
MR. GRUBER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PLANT: 
MR. GRUBER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. PLANT: 
MR. GRUBER: 
Great, sounds good. 
Okay. Thank you. 
Thank you. 
Thank you. 
Okay, bye-bye. 
Thanks, your Honor. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on October 18, 2005) 
3 THE COURT: Hello? 
4 MS. FACE: Hello? 
5 MR. PLANT: Hello, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: This here is the matter of Robert and 
7 Jackie Face vs. Beutler Enterprises and others. It's case 
8 No. 030905851. For the record would everybody identify 
9 themselves, please? 
10 MR. PLANT: This is Terry Plant for the defendants, your 
11 Honor. 
12 MS. FACE: And I am Jackie Face, Robert L. Face's wife. 
13 THE COURT: And do I have Robert on the phone, too? 
14 MR. FACE: Yes, you do. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I had set this for scheduling 
16 purposes, and I've received and I've just reviewed, Mr. Face, 
17 your ex parte application for an enlargement of time. I'm 
18 certainly not opposed to extending the time for the Faces to 
19 obtain Counsel. 
20 MR. PLANT: Your Honor, I told Mrs. Face — she called 
21 me — this is Terry Plant — about a week ago or so that I would 
22 give her — agreed to, I think — Mrs. Face, was it the 18th of 
23 November that we agreed to? 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Face, you should send Mr. Plant a 
25 copy of the ex parte enlarge — motion for enlargement of time. 
26 That's what was represented in the ex parte enlargement as well. 
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1 I certainly appreciate that and think it's entirely appropriate. 
2 MR. PLANT: Your Honor, I have no objection. In fact, I 
3 already agreed to it subject only to your approval. 
4 THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I certainly appreciate that. I 
5 mean that's entirely appropriate under the circumstances. 
6 Mr. and Mrs. Face, I think it — will November 18th give 
7 you sufficient time? 
8 MS. FACE: Your Honor, that would be of great help to us 
9 if you could do that. 
10 THE COURT: Of course. That's not a problem. In fact, 
11 Mr. Plant, I'm going to ask that you prepare the order extending 
12 the time for Mr. and Mrs. Face to appear or appoint Counsel to 
13 November the 18th. 
14 MR. PLANT: Did you say you were asking me to do that, 
15 your Honor? 
16 THE COURT: I was. 
17 MR. PLANT: Okay. I'll be happy to do that. 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 MR. PLANT: The 18th of November, correct? 
20 THE COURT: The 18th of November, close of business the 
21 18th of November. Then at that time would you notify Counsel, if 
22 you have Counsel before then, notify Mr. Plant. 
23 Mr. Plant, will you contact the Court and once you have 
24 an idea of whether Mr. and Mrs. Face are proceeding pro se or 
25 with Counsel to schedule a scheduling conference in this case so 
2 6 that we can get it moving? 
- 4 -
1 MR. PLANT: Sure. I'll be happy to do that. 
2 THE COURT: Until then I'm disinclined to schedule 
3 another scheduling conference unless somebody really wants one. 
4 MR. PLANT: That makes sense. 
5 MS. FACE: Your Honor, may I speak? 
6 THE COURT: Of course. 
7 MS. FACE: This is Jackie. I have — we have actively 
8 been seeking Counsel, and the last attorney that we talked to 
9 there was a conflict there of Counsel. So we are definitely busy 
10 trying to find someone to represent us. We certainly do not want 
11 to be pro se. 
12 THE COURT: I understand, and I — 
13 MS. FACE: Thank you so much. 
14 THE COURT: No problem. I'll give you the time that you 
15 need. 
16 MS. FACE: Thank you so much. 
17 THE COURT: That's no problem. So why don't you — when 
18 you obtain Counsel if you would do me the courtesy — 
19 MS. FACE: Certainly will. 
20 THE COURT: All right. All right, is there anything 
21 else that anybody needs? 
22 MR. PLANT: No. I'll prepare an order, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Face, the reason I didn't scrub 
24 the telephone conference is it was purely for this purpose, to 
25 make sure we're all on the same page and to set a time certain 
2 6 for you to get Counsel. 
-5-
MS. FACE: Thank you. 
MR. FACE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. PLANT: Sir? 
MS. FACE: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. PLANT: See you. 
THE COURT: Bye. 
MS. FACE: Bye. 
THE COURT: Bye-bye. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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